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ABSTRACT 
Historically emotions have been excluded from the 
moral sphere. However, in this century there have been at 
least two theories which do recognize a relationship between 
ethics and the emotions, namely, A. J. Ayer's emotivism and 
Dietrich von Hildebrand's theory of affective morality. 
Emotivism is a theory which claims that when one 
makes an ethical judgment, such as "murder is wrong," one is 
not saying anything about murder but merely evincing the 
emotions one has with respect to murder. It is as if one 
said "murder" in a particularly harsh tone of voice and 
nothing more. 
In contrast, von Hildebrand's theory claims that 
not only is murder truly wrong but when one hears of a 
murder one should respond with the appropriate emotional 
response, such as sorrow or righteous anger. 
Because of its adoption of the empirical verifiabil-
ity criterion, Ayer's theory holds that all value statements 
are cognitively meaningless and all value judgments, includ-
ing those of morality, are nothing but expressions of emo-
tions. This theory removes ethics from meaningful philo-
sophical discourse and deems it to be a subject only for the 
social sciences. This theory can be found faulty on many 
ii 
accounts. Not only can it be shown that by the existence of 
purely ethical arguments Ayer's theory is refuted but also 
it can be shown that this theory is self-annihilating. 
On the other hand, von Hildebrand's theory offers a 
clear analysis of the affective sphere and its moral perti-
nence. Von Hildebrand's explanation of the "heart" as 
denoting the affective sphere elucidates the distinction 
between the affective response and the other entities with 
which it may easily be confused. Due to its intentional 
nature, the affective response may be morally correct or 
morally incorrect. It is the morally conscious person who 
uses his cooperative freedom to sanction an appropriate 
affective response and/or to disavow an inappropriate affec-
tive response. 
Thus it is shown that emotions do fall within the 
realm of ethics and a meaningful relationship can be estab-
lished between ethics and emotions. 
iii 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY 
Is there any relevant connection between ethics and 
emotions? Can any meaningful relation between these two 
diverse subjects be discovered? The nature of this work is 
to examine two theories which do make claims to the impor-
tant relationship between ethics and emotions. The first 
theory reduces all ethical discourse either to subject 
matter for the social sciences or to mere emotive utter-
ances. Under this theory, when one says, "murder is wrong," 
one is merely evincing one's bad feelings concerning murder. 
The second theory places emotions within the realm of ethics 
by claiming that one's affective responses can be bearers of 
moral values. For this theory, not only is murder wrong but 
when one hears of a murder one should give the right, due 
appropriate affective response, such as sorrow or _ righteous 
anger. 
A prime example of the first theory is the emotivism 
of the logical positivists. For this study the work of 
Alfred Jules Ayer as found in his second edition of Lan-
guage, Truth and Logic 1 , the so-called Bible of logical 
1The second edition of Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic 
is specifically mentioned because in this edition's preface 
Ayer offers significant clarifications to the first edition. 
1 
positivism, will be the focal point of the examination of 
the logical positivists' theory. The phenomenological 
theory of spiritual affectivity as given by Dietrich von 
Hildebrand will be the main topic of discussion for the 
second theory. 
Before proceeding to examine Ayer's work, it is 
important to note that emotivism has evolved over the years 
and to the extent that it exists today it continues in its 
evolution. The emotivism put forth by A. J. Ayer in Lan-
guage, Truth and Logic, was refined later by Charles L. 
Stevenson and published in his Ethics and Language, among 
other works. A thorough examination of the development of 
this ethical theory would begin with Ayer's emotivism and 
its subsequent modifications followed by a discussion of 
later developments with emphasis given to Stevenson's work. 
2 
This present work limits itself to a discussion of 
Ayer's emotivism as found in the second edition of Language, 
Truth and Logic which by no means is meant to ignore the 
importance of the later developments of this ethical theory, 
but rather to give the humble recognition that such an 
academic pursuit goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
This study aims to examine emotivism, to demonstrate 
its inadequacy as an ethical theory, and to offer the pheno-
menological theory that morality includes affectivity as put 
forth by von Hildebrand as the more appropriate appraisal of 
the connection between ethics and emotions. 
CHAPTER ONE 
AN EXPOSITION OF A. J. AYER'S EMOTIVISM AS FOUND IN HIS 
LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 
A: OVERVIEW 
In chapter six of his revolutionary work, Language, 
Truth and Logic, entitled "Critique of Ethics and Theology," 
A. J. Ayer intends to show that all statements 1 of value, 
whether ethical, aesthetical, metaphysical, or religious, 
"are not in the literal sense significant, but are simply 
expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor 
false." 2 Ayer removes morality, ethics, aesthetics, and 
religious issues from the realm of metaphysics by claiming 
that statements made with respect to these subjects are 
1Ayer uses the word "statement" ambiguously. Due to 
the importance of this term in any discourse concerning 
language this ambiguity is unfortunate. Ayer himself admits 
to this ambiguity in the preface of the second edition. The 
present author has taken the liberty to substitute when 
necessary clarifications for this term. However, since Ayer 
himself would not ascribe the full status of proposition to 
"statement," in providing an overview of Ayer's theory the 
author has remained faithful to Ayer's use of the word 
"statement." An in-depth examination of his use of "state-
ment" is given in chapter two of this present work which is 
based on the introduction of the second edition of Language, 
Truth and Logic. 
2Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2d. ed. 
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1946; first published 
in 1936), 103. Future reference will be given as: Ayer, 
Language. 
3 
4 
merely pseudo-propositions and therefore are neither true 
nor false. This is equivalent to a denial of the meanings 
of such statements which has led to a metaphysical denial of 
the existence of any referent. 
B: AYER'S CATEGORIZATION OF ETHICAL STATEMENTS 
To accomplish his goal, Ayer categorizes ethical 
statements into four classes. The first contains "propo-
sitions which express definitions of ethical terms." 3 The 
second contains propositions that describe moral experiences 
or the causes of such experiences. Moral exhortations 
comprise the third class while the fourth consists of moral 
judgments. 
For Ayer the only category suitable for philosoph-
ical study is the first, propositions which define ethical 
terms. He relegates the second to the social sciences, 
namely psychology or sociology. The third he considers to 
be merely "ejaculations or commands" 4 and therefore not 
propositions. He does not give an explanation for moral 
judgments save that they are to be excluded from philosophi-
cal study (his argument for this exclusion comprises the 
thrust . of his emotive theory). Making a radical break away 
from how ethics is usually done, he proposes that: 
A strictly philosophical treatise on ethics should 
therefore make no ethical pronouncements. But it 
,.. 
should, by giving an analysis of ethical terms, show 
what is the category to which all such pronouncements 
belong. 5 
C: AYER'S REJECTION OF CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORIES 
5 
Before introducing his emotive theory of ethical 
statements, Ayer first removes the reasonability · of an 
adherence to any of the major contemporary ethical theories, 
namely: utilitarianism, subjectivism, and intuitionism. 
He uses the following considerations against utili-
tarianism and subjectivism: he describes utilitarianism as 
defining "the rightness of actions, and the goodness of 
ends" 6 via the net gain of happiness which they provide. 
Ayer proposes this theory to be untenable for the following 
reason: if "increasing our happiness" is given as the 
definition of right, it would then be contradictory to claim 
that 'X' increases a person's happiness, but 'X' is, never-
theless, not right (just as it is a contradiction to say 
that 'X' is a woman, but nevertheless not a female). How-
ever, since claiming this is not contradictory, it cannot be 
correct to define the rightness of 'X' by its increasing a 
person's happiness. 
He perceives subjectivism as defining "rightness of 
actions, and the goodness of ends" 7 in terms of the amount 
5 Ibid., 103-104. 
6 Ibid. , 104. 
of approval given to them by persons. Ayer finds subjec-
tivism faulty for a reason similar to the one he uses 
against utilitarianism. Namely, it is not a contradiction 
to say that 'X' is approved by many, yet, 'X' is not right. 
Therefore, it cannot be correct to define 'right' in terms 
of popular approval. 
6 
Ayer holds that both of these theories place morali-
ty under psychology or sociology. Such placements allow 
ethical judgments, or, in Ayer's words, "assertions," to be 
treated similarly to "factual assertions" and allow "empiri-
cal hypotheses" to be equally applied to them. 8 Ayer con-
siders utilitarianism and subjectivism to be only concerned 
with descriptive symbols. He considers descriptive ethical 
symbols which are found in statements expressing zeitgeist 
to be a subject for the social sciences. By rejecting both 
of these theories due to their inherent difficulties, Ayer 
limits his analysis to normative ethical symbols. 
By normative he means that which expresses an ethi-
cal judgment. It is only normative symbols, and not de-
scriptive ones, that he takes to be "indefinable in factual 
terms." 9 • As a sufficient reason for this elimination of 
moral judgments, which would otherwise be considered to be a 
large part of philosophical study, Ayer subsequently offers 
his emotive theory. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. , 105. 
7 
Following his dismissal of utilitarianism and sub-
jectivism, Ayer suggests that the intuitionists' theory 
appears now to be the only viable alternative . Intuitionism 
is a theory according to which the validity of moral judg-
ments must be considered to be "intrinsic" or "absolute." 
The intuitionists' position maintains that value 
statements can not be empirically verified but are rather 
known via intuition. In a skeptical fashion, Ayer proposes 
that since people may have different views with respect to a 
particular value judgment a criterion is needed to determine 
which view is correct. Since no empirical criterion, and 
for Ayer this means no criterion whatsoever, is possible to 
decide between apparently contradictory intuitions 10 he 
asserts that "a mere appeal to intuition is worthless as a 
test of a proposition's validity." 11 He rejects the intu-
itionists' theory of self-evidence since it is in complete 
opposition to the logical positivists' main theory that "a 
synthetic proposition is significant only if it is empiri-
cally verifiable. " 12 Thus for Ayer, one cannot claim that 
the proposition expressed by "it is never just to punish a 
child for the crimes of his mother" is true, since it is not 
an empirically verifiable statement, and since an appeal to 
10Mark Roberts points out that valid intuitions cannot 
be contradictory, rather what can be contradictory are 
propositions which are claimed to be known via intuition. 
11Ayer, Language, 106. 
12 Ibid., 106. 
intuition is unjustifiable. 
D: AYER'S EMOTIVE THEORY 
Ayer claims that "fundamental ethical concepts are 
unanalysable" 13 since there are no criteria by which to 
determine the validity of the judgments which they compose. 
As far as Ayer is concerned, the intuitionists offer no 
explanation for this unanalyzability 14 and hence he pro-
poses that "the reason why they are unanalysable is that 
they are mere pseudo-concepts. " 15 He further contends that 
"sentences which contain normative ethical symbols are not 
equivalent to sentences which express psychological propo-
sitions, or indeed empirical propositions of any kind." 16 
Thus, for Ayer, normative ethical concepts contribute 
nothing to the factual contents of propositions. 
8 
By Ayer's analysis, to proclaim, "You acted wrongly 
in stealing that mango" is conceptually equivalent to stat-
ing, "You stole that mango." By means of the word "wrongly" 
one is merely revealing one's own feelings about the action 
and saying nothing additionally about the action itself. It 
is as if one merely uttered the words, "You stole that 
13 Ibid. , 107. 
14Ayer ignores that in fact the intuitionists do pro-
vide explanations for what they call the unanalyzability of 
the good. G. E. Moore offers the simplicity of the quality 
good. see chapter one of G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica. 
15Ayer, Language, 107. 
16 Ibid., 105. 
9 
mango," in a certain disapproving tone or wrote the sentence 
with large dark exclamation marks. Ethical terms only 
function to be expressive of the speaker's emotions without 
adding any literal 17 or factual significance to the sen-
tence itself. All normative ethical symbols, whether found 
in sentences which also contain empirical facts or merely in 
sentences which express moral sentiment, have only an emo-
tive function. These symbols are used only to express 
emotions concerning the objects referred to but in actuality 
they say nothing about these objects whatsoever. This is 
the case whenever one makes an ethical judgment. 
If the statement, "You acted wrongly in stealing 
that mango," is generalized to be "stealing is wrong," this 
generalization only expresses a feeling of "moral disap-
proval" and provides "no factual meaning." 18 Without mean-
ing no proposition is present. Without the presence of a 
proposition the statement can be neither true nor false, 
since only propositions are the bearers of truth or falsity. 
It is merely a~ if one said "stealing" with a certain tone 
of voice or as an exclamation. 
17Ayer does not offer a definition of literal but it 
seems that words and exclamation marks are literal. If this 
is so, then it seems to be clearly false that ethical terms, 
or any value terms add no literal significance to sentences, 
since something literal is added by there being more words 
and words are literal. Yet, Fritz Wenisch notes that some-
thing literal may be added which may or may not have any 
cognitive meaning. See Ayer, Language, 107. 
18 Ayer, Language, 107. 
1. The Impossibility of Contradictory Ethical 
Statements 
10 
Since, according to Ayer, there is neither truth nor 
falsity with respect to moral judgments, people may seem to 
disagree but there can be no contradictions among ethical 
statements 19 • Ayer argues that when one says that an ac-
tion is good or bad, one is neither providing factual infor-
mation nor information about one's own mental or emotional 
state, as a subjectivist 20 would hold. Rather, one is 
merely evincing one's emotions. This is likewise the case 
with the one who offers the apparently contradictory judg-
ment. Since neither one is expressing a proposition neither 
can be right nor wrong. 
With respect to conflicts concerning empirical 
19This again is an ambiguous use of the word "state-
ment." Since declarative sentences are merely linguistic 
expression of propositions they can be neither true nor 
false. Propositions, as the meanings of declarative sen-
tences, are the bearers of truth or falsity. Yet it seems 
that Ayer would never ascribe the rank of proposition to an 
ethical judgment. 
20Ayer uses two different senses of subjectivism with-
out making a clear distinction between the two. He first 
considers subjectivism to be the ethical theory which de-
fines right as that which is given societal approval (see 
above discussion under "Ayer's Rejection of Contemporary 
Ethical Theories"). The second sense which he employs here 
considers ethical statements to be merely statements about 
the speaker's feelings. It seems that he assumes that in 
saying "'X' is right" one means that one approves of 'X' and 
that one has the corresponding amiable feelings of approval 
about 'X'. He neglects that it is possible for one to 
approve of 'X' while also detesting it, as in the case of 
what one may consider to be a necessary evil. For example, 
one may approve of the need for final examinations and 
approve of them while simultaneously having no felicitous 
feelings about them. 
.. 
11 
propositions Ayer claims that a resolution can be obtained 
via an empirical test; but since there is no empirical test 
with respect to ethical pronouncements there can be no 
resolution. He thus concludes that 
We can now see why it is impossible to find a crite-
rion for determining the validity of ethical judgements. 
It is not because they have an "absolute" validity which 
is mysteriously independent of ordinary sense-experi-
ence, but because they have no objective validity what-
soever. 21 , 
2. The Purely Emotive Function of Value Judgments 
For Ayer, no sentence expressing an ethical judgment 
has any meaningful content. Ayer likewise holds the same 
for any statement concerning values, such as those of Aes-
thetics, Metaphysics, and Theology. Such a sentence is 
merely an expression of a feeling, as if someone said "ouch" 
or "ooohh," and thereby has no relevance to truth or falsi-
ty. Therefore, in Ayer's view, sentences which express 
moral judgments "are unverifiable for the same reason as a 
cry of pain or a word of command is unverifiable - because 
they do not express genuine propositions. " 22 
He further proposes that moral judgments do not 
only express emotions but are also employed to arouse 
emotions and to incite others to action. He maintains that 
ethical words may be defined both by the various emotions 
which they express and by the responses they are intended to 
21 Ayer, Language, 108. 
22 Ibid., 108-109 . 
12 
promote. 23 
Ayer's position on the unverifiability of the 
pseudo-propositions of ethical judgments diverges from the 
subjectivists' position that ethical statements are really 
assertions about the speaker's emotions, that is, about the 
speaker's approval or disapproval, and are therefore propo-
sitions. Unlike the subjectivists, who hold "that ethical 
statements actually assert the existence of certain feel-
ings, " 24 Ayer contends that these statements are only 
excitants and expressions of emotions which make no claim to 
the actual existence of such emotions. He holds that sen-
tences which express moral judgments are not declarations of 
propositions but "are expressions and excitants of feeling 
which do not necessarily involve any assertions. " 25 
If, as the subjectivists contend, ethical judgments 
were propositions they could then be either true or false. 
Their truth or falsity could be determined by their corre-
spondence to the author's emotions which would in principle 
be verifiable. For example, if a speaker says that "'X' is 
right" the truth or falsity of the expressed proposition 
could be determined by whether the speaker approves of 'X', 
making the proposition true or whether the speaker disap-
proves of 'X', rendering the proposition false. However, 
23 Ibid., 108. 
24 Ibid., 109. 
25 Ibid., 109-110. 
13 
Ayer points out that his theory does not require the exis-
tence of feelings as "a necessary and sufficient condition 
of the validity of an ethical judgement. It implies, on the 
contrary, that ethical judgements have no validity. " 26 
Thus, for Ayer moral judgments have no validity. 
This allows his theory to avoid being subject to the common 
objection held against the subjectivists' theory that the 
nature of the speaker's feelings does not determine the 
validity of the ethical statement. Whenever one makes what 
one considers to be a moral judgment, its function is purely 
emotive in that it merely reveals one's feelings concerning 
an object and is never an assertion that the speaker has a 
certain feeling. Thus, Ayer explains, 
In saying that tolerance was a virtue, I should not be 
making any statement about my own feelings or about 
anything else. I should simply be evincing mv feelings, 
which is not at all the same thing as saying that I have 
them. [emphasis added] 27 
He further maintains that even though an assertion that one 
has a particular emotion "always " 28 also expresses this 
feeling, the expression of the feeling is not necessarily 
co-existent with the assertion that one does indeed have 
that emotion. 
3. Impossibility of a Purely Ethical Argument 
26 Ibid., 110. 
27 Ibid., 109. 
28 Ibid. 
14 
However, the criticism G. E. Moore raises against 
the subjectivists' theory, namely that their theory cannot 
account for the fact of actual disputes concerning ethical 
judgments, is one which Ayer does consider applicable to his 
own theory. He holds this criticism to be the only objec-
tion which could likewise be raised against his own posi-
tion. He admits that if this objection were able to refute 
the subjectivists' theory, his also would be refuted when he 
states: "If Moore's argument really refutes the ordinary 
subjectivist theory, it also refutes ours." 29 Yet, he 
denies the possibility of both of these refutations by 
claiming "that one really never does dispute about questions 
of value. 1130 Ayer holds that what the ordinary person 
considers as a dispute regarding values is not a dispute 
about values but about facts: 
When someone disagrees with us about the moral value of 
a certain action or type of action, we do admittedly 
resort to argument in order to win him over to our way 
of thinking. But we do not attempt to show by our 
argument that he has the "wrong" ethical feeling towards 
a situation whose nature he has correctly apprehended. 
What we attempt to show is that he is mistaken about the 
facts of the case. 31 
Ayer suggests such facts as the motives of the 
agent, the expected outcome of the situation, and the 
circumstances concerning the situation. It is by producing 
29 Ibid., 110. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 110-111. 
15 
agreement concerning "the nature of the empirical facts 1132 
that one attempts to get his opponent to agree with him. 
This works well if both have the same moral conditioning, 
but, if these moral principles are not shared, then one 
resorts to saying "that it is impossible to argue with 
him" 33 since his set of morals is unlike one's own. Each 
feels that his personal set of values is superior to the 
other's. Neither can offer proof of this since to make such 
a judgment is to make a value judgment which according to 
Ayer cannot be subject to argument. Thus Ayer concludes, 
It is because argument fails us when we come to deal 
with pure questions of value, as distinct from questions 
of fact, that we finally resort to mere abuse. 34 
For Ayer, argument is possible with regards to ethi-
cal questions only under a presupposed system. He maintains 
that if one disapproves of a certain type of action then 
once a conclusive argument is produced which shows that a 
particular action is of that same type, disapproval must . 
also be given to that particular action if one is to be 
consistent with one's system. However, no argument can be 
given to prove the validity of any system. Each person can 
only laud or condemn an ethical system based on the system 
he himself presupposes. 
Ayer further holds that no example, not even one, 
32 Ibid., 111. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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can be provided 
to construct even s.Il imaginary argument on a question of 
value which does not reduce itself to an argument about 
a question of logic or about an empirical matter of fact 
[ emphasis added]. 35 
He contends that "the impossibility of purely ethical 
arguments is not, as Moore thought, a ground of objection 
to our theory, but rather a point in favour of it. " 36 
4. Removal of Ethics from Philosophy 
Without taking into account any further possible 
objections Ayer asserts "that ethical philosophy consists 
simply in saying that ethical concepts are pseudo-concepts 
and therefore unanalysable. " 37 For him there can be no 
ethical science since it is impossible to validate any 
ethical system. The only things which may be done belong 
either to psychology, by describing the emotional expres-
sions and excitants of ethical terms, or to sociology, by 
inquiring into the moral habits and feelings of different 
groups of people. Thus, the study of ethics is not a sub-
ject for philosophy but rather one for the social sciences. 
Ayer, in discussing motivational factors for moral 
behavior, first attributes fear, either that of an angry God 
or an angry society, to be a primary motivation for moral 
actions. It is this, according to Ayer, which gives rise to 
35 Ibid., 112. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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the notion of Kant's categorical imperatives. A second 
motivation for the recommendations of moral behavior is that 
a society promotes such systems for its ultimate benefit. 
Ayer takes this to be the spring board for eudaemonism and 
hedonism. He criticizes these moral theories for taking 
propositions which refer to the causes and attributes of 
our ethical feelings as if they were definitions of 
ethical concepts. And thus they fail to recognise that 
ethical concepts are pseudo-concepts and consequently 
indefinable. 38 
Ayer subsequently holds that inquiry into moral (as 
well as aesthetical and religious) experiences is limited 
merely to providing information about people's mental and 
physical composition. As if this were not a radical enough 
break from the commonly held view, he continues by con-
tending that 
any attempt to make our use of ethical and aesthetic 
concepts the basis of a metaphysical theory concerning 
the existence of a world of values, as distinct from the 
world of facts, involves a false analysis of these 
concepts. 39 
With this, he believes that he has refuted Kant's proof of 
the transcendent existence of a divine being since his own 
analysis shows that moral phenomena cannot give support to 
"any rationalist or metaphysical doctrine whatsoever. 1140 
Ayer originally introduced his emotive theory to 
counter an objection which an "objectivist" ethics would 
38 Ibid., 113. 
39 Ibid., 114. 
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raise against his epistemology, namely his empirical veri-
fiability criterion of meaning, even though he later 
affirms, in the introduction to the second edition of Lan-
guage, Truth and Logic, that his emotive theory of ethics 
validly stands on its own as well as being a response to an 
epistemological difficulty. Before giving a critique of 
Ayer's emotive theory, it is relevant to this study that the 
keystone of logical positivism, namely the empirical veri-
fiability criterion of meaning, be examined. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE VERIFIABILITY CRITERION 
Even though it is difficult to state what is actual-
ly held as the verifiability criterion of meaning due to its 
constant revisions since the emergence of logical positiv-
ism, a thorough study of its evolution and its various 
formulations, constructions and implications would be a very 
edifying endeavor. Unfortunately, due to its complexity and 
enormity, such a pursuit is not appropriate for this present 
discussion. However, since Ayer's work is the focus of this 
study, an examination of his formulations of the verifiabil-
ity criterion of meaning as found in Language, Truth and 
Logic will be given. 
A: AYER'S VERSION OF THE VERIFIABILITY CRITERION 
In the introduction to the second edition of 
Language, Truth and Logic Ayer explains that the principle 
of verifiability is intended to provide a criterion which 
allows one to determine if "a sentence is literally meaning-
ful."1 It is a foundational element of Language, Truth and 
Logic that a sentence is literally meaningful if and only if 
the proposition which it expresses is "either analytic or 
1Ayer, Language, 5. 
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empirically verifiable." 2 Since a proposition is a tau-
tology if and only if it is analytic, making no factual 
claim to a state of affairs, Ayer maintains that it is 
solely the definitions of the symbols contained in the 
tautology that determine its validity. 3 If it is impos-
20 
sible to verify a putative proposition's truth or falsity 
via sense - experience and if it is not a tautology, then Ayer 
claims it is merely metaphysical and thereby "is neither 
true nor false but literally senseless." 4 
John Foster, in his work on Ayer, addresses the 
point that in holding that analytic propositions are void of 
any factual content Ayer "sometimes abbreviates the central 
thesis to the bare assertion that any factual proposition 
mus t be empirically verifiable." 5 
1. Strong and Weak Verifiability 
Ayer offers two senses of verifiability, the strong 
and the weak sense. In the strong sense, a statement must be 
ver i fiable in practice, that is, it must be possible to 
conclusively establish its truth via experience. In the 
weak sense a statement is only required to be verifiable in 
3Strictly speaking, only linguistic expressions, i.e., 
sentences, and not their meanings, propositions, can have 
symbols. 
4Ayer, Language, 31. 
5John Foster, Ayer (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1985), 2. 
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principle, that is its verifiability need only be considered 
to be possible. He offers the example that even though the 
proposition expressed in the sentence "there are mountains 
on the far side of the moon" is impossible to verify prac-
tically it is verifiable in principle since a person may 
know which observations are needed even if he himself cannot 
make them. 
However, Ayer also holds that 
no proposition, other than a tautology, can possibly be 
anything more than a probable hypothesis. And if this is 
correct, the principle that a sentence can be factually 
significant only if it expresses what is conclusively 
verifiable is self-stultifying as a criterion of sig-
nificance. For it leads to the conclusion that it is 
impossible to make a significant statement of fact at 
all. 6 
Only the weak sense of verifiability is ever used. The 
strong sense of verifiability lacks any possible application 
and therefore, weak is "the only sense in which any proposi-
tion could conceivably be verified." 7 Consequently, Ayer 
later reformulates his criterion to allow propositions to be 
verifiable only in principle and not in practice to have 
significance. He does not limit it to conclusive evidence 
which is almost an impossibility in any case. 
2. The Employment of the Word "Statement" 
Ayer attempts to dismiss two crucial criticism 
against his formulation of the empirical verifiability 
6Ayer, Language, 38. 
7 Ibid., 10. 
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criterion, namely that it would not apply to sentences which 
do not express propositions and "that the question which it 
was designed to answer must already have been answered 
before the principle could be applied." 8 He attributes the 
difficulty to terminology. As a remedy, Ayer suggests 
circumventing any reference to propositions by applying the 
verifiability criterion directly to sentences. Yet, because 
of various difficulties Ayer concludes that "sentence" 
cannot be substituted for "proposition." As a solution he 
offers his own technical sense of the word "statement." 
"Statement" is Ayer's term which refers "indefi-
nitely to 'what sentences express' in cases where the sen-
tences themselves are not particularly specified." 9 
According to Foster, Ayer understands "statement" as quasi-
-propositions expressed by grammatically well formulated 
indicative sentences. 10 Ayer explains that statements are 
expressed by every indicative sentence regardless of whether 
it is literally meaningful or not. Likewise, he considers 
statements to be the expressions of any set of mutually 
translatable sentences. 
In contrast, however, Ayer reserves the word "propo-
sition" "for what is expressed by sentences which are 
8 Ibid. 6. 
9 Ibid. , 8. 
1
°Foster, 14-15. 
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literally meaningful." 11 Consequently, under Ayer's termi-
nology, propositions are a sub-class of statements and the 
principle of verifiability determines which statements are 
propositions from those which are not. Thus, the principle 
of verifiability is to be applied to statements: "a state-
ment is held to be literally meaningful if and only if it is 
either analytic or empirically verifiable. 1112 
B: CRITICISMS OF THE VERIFIABILITY CRITERION 
1. Empirical Foundation 
First of all, it is noted by c. E. M. Joad in his 
Critique of Logical Positivism, that the empiricism which is 
the foundation for both logical positivism and particularly 
its principle of the verifiability criterion of meaning is 
in opposition to the traditional value philosophy of the 
western world. Since values have no physical attributes, 
such as weight or volume, they are not objects of the empir-
ical sciences. By denying the existence of anything which 
is not perceived through the senses, the only knowable order 
of being is that given by immediate sense experience. Thus 
to the logical positivist it is a deception to think of 
values as being independent attributes of objects since for 
the logical positivist there can be no such attributes. 
With the application of the empirical verifiability 
11Ayer, Language, 8. 
12 Ibid., 9. 
criterion of meaning, religion, aesthetics, and ethics are 
all considered to be meaningless. All metaphysical and 
24 
value philosophy are wiped away, that is, eliminated. 
explains that 
Joad 
The first effect of the application of logical positiv-
ist techniques ... is to induce a thorough-going scep-
ticism. The natural order has ... no basis in a 
supernatural order from which it derives its meaning and 
its purpose. Values are without reality and morals 
without meaning.u 
Ayer thus dismisses much of the subject matter of 
philosophy as well as the questions which philosophy seeks 
to answer, since the only possible answers would be non-sen-
sical. He proposes that 
much of what ordinarily passes for philosophy is 
metaphysical [neither true nor false, but literally 
meaningless] according to this criterion, and, in 
particular, that it can not be significantly asserted 
that there is a non-empirical world of values, or that 
men have immortal souls, or that there is a transcendent 
God . 14 
Under Ayer's views, the traditional questions of philosophy 
are merely pseudo-questions. 
2. Removal of the World of Values from Reality 
Since value cannot be studied through the empirical 
sciences, it is clear that Ayer does not recognize the world 
of values as an objective reality. He contends that 
13 C. E. M. Joad, A Critique of Logical Positivism 
(Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), 
149. 
14 Ayer, Language, 31. 
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no statement which refers to a "reality" transcending 
the limits of all possible sense-experience can possibly 
have any literal significance; from which it must follow 
that the labours of those who have striven to describe 
such a reality have all been devoted to the production 
of nonsense. 15 
Thus, any value statement is deflated into meaninglessness 
since it is impossible for it to meet the verifiability 
criterion of meaning under any of the criterion's various 
formulations. In saying that something is sublime, good, 
praiseworthy, beautiful, etc. one is not referring to any 
quality which the thing may have in itself but rather one is 
merely evincing some feeling which one has and which one 
associates with the thing. 
It is critical to this work that the world of values 
be recognized as truly existing and as being an intrinsic 
attribute of certain objects, for, as noted by Dietrich von 
Hildebrand: "The fact that something is endowed with a 
value is at the basis of every true moral norm. " 16 
3. The Existence of the World of Values 
Although in one respect value adds nothing to a 
being's constitutive nature, in another respect it adds a 
great deal to the being. As John Crosby notes, it is 
similar to 
the way in which existence does not add to the essence 
15 Ibid. , 34. 
16Dietrich von Hildebrand, Ethics (Chicago: Franciscan 
Herald Press 1972), 128. Future references will be given as 
Ethics. 
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of being, and yet in its own way adds tremendously much 
to the being. Value is a non-constitutive, yet highly 
significant, attribute of a being, in the way in which 
existence is a non-essential, yet highly significant, 
attribute of a being. 17 
Yet, unlike existence which is not, in contingent finite 
beings, produced from nor dependent upon the essence, a 
being's value does arise from and is dependent upon "the 
cons ti tuti ve nature of the valuable being. " 18 
Crosby makes a similar analogy between the value of 
a being and the constitutive nature of the valuable being 
with a state of affairs and its constitutive elements. He 
states that 
value is not a new constitutive property which grows out 
of other constitutive properties but is rather a certain 
non-constitutive Auspraegung of the constitutive nature 
of the being; and just as a state of affairs is the 
underlying beings in (a certain aspect of) their intel-
ligibility, so the value of a thing is the thing in its 
dignity . 19 
He further notes "that the values of a being are not 
extrinsically (aeusserlich) related to the being but are 
intelligibly grounded in the being. 1120 
Crosby contends that the lack of descriptive content 
in value statements has led to various forms of value sub-
jectivism. Like emotivism, these claim that the lack of 
17 John Crosby, "Ingarden and Moore on Value" (Interna-
tional Academy for Philosophy, Liechtenstein: unpublished 
manuscript, n.d.), 8-9. 
18 Ibid., 9. 
19 Ibid. , 10. 
20 Ibid. , 11. 
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descriptive content results from there being no values, nor 
any experience of values as such, and that the use of value 
language is not for the purpose of description but rather is 
for "some other, more 'dynamic' function." 21 
As a classic example of an empirical argument 
against the existence of values, Crosby refers to David 
Hume's eradication of beauty from the circle. This argument 
is especially relevant since Ayer holds that his views are 
"the logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and David 
Hume. " 22 He quotes the following passage from Hume's An 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals: 
Euclid has fully explained all the qualities of the 
circle; but has not in any proposition said a word of 
its beauty. The reason is evident. The beauty is not a 
quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the 
line, whose parts are equally distant from a common 
centre. It is only the effect which that figure pro-
duces upon the mind, whose peculiar fabric of structure 
renders it susceptible of such sentiments. 23 
Crosby claims that Hume's conclusion that beauty is 
only in the mind of the viewer of the circle goes too far. 
Rather, one may merely conclude "that beauty is not any 
constitutive property of the circle; the beauty of the 
circle is 'not in any part of the line' which is the 
21 Ibid. , 12. 
22 Ayer, Language, 31. 
23
"Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 
(La Salle, IL, 1966; reprint of first ed. of 1777), 132," in 
John Crosby's "Ingarden and Moore on Value," 12. 
circle. " 24 Hume's erroneous conclusion is based on the 
assumption that a being only consists of its constitutive 
properties. Yet, as c.s. Lewis notes in his The Abolition 
28 
It is not the greatest of modern scientists who feel 
most sure that the object, stripped of its qualitative 
properties and reduced to mere quantity is wholly real . 
. . . The great minds know very well that the object, so 
treated, is an artificial abstraction, that something of 
its reality has been lost." 25 
Beauty, like other values, is a non-constitutive 
property of a being and therefore should not be sought, nor 
can it be found, as if it were such a property. Just as the 
existence of a finite being cannot be found as an essential 
property of that being, Crosby maintains that: 
the beauty of the circle belongs (non-constitutively) to 
the circle as absolutely as do the properties demon-
strated of the circle by Euclid, and is as independent 
of our sentiments as these are. 26 
Accordingly, Crosby concludes that "value, though non-con-
stitutive, might nevertheless be an absolute moment of a 
being. " 27 
Thus, it has been shown that although values are not 
constitutive properties of objects and thereby are not 
24Crosby, 13 . 
2sc. s. 
Publishing 
Publishing 
edition). 
Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Macmillan 
Company, 194 7; reprint, New York: Macmillan 
Company, 1955), 82 (page references are to reprint 
26 Crosby, 13. 
27 Ibid., 14. 
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objects of empirical inquiry, they should not be dismissed 
as being meaningless entities and unworthy of intellectual 
discourse. As Dietrich von Hildebrand explains, the very 
nature of values is such that they are autonomous and inde-
pendent from any person's intellectual grasping of them; 
they are beyond being mere inventions in the minds of their 
observers. Von Hildebrand continues: 
To ignore the essential difference between merely 
contingent facts and these entities, which have essences 
so potent as to exclude any possibility of denying them 
objectively, and to place them on the same level with 
any contingent quiddity, thus betrays a degree of philo-
sophical incapacity and superficiality which from the 
start dooms every theory touched by this blindness. 28 
However, despite all theoretical denials, people are con-
stantly presupposing moral values. For one to grasp these 
values one need only to gain a full awareness of one's own 
experience of reality. 29 
4. Inadequacy of the Verifiability Criterion 
According to the verifiability criterion of mea~ing, 
all propositions must be in principle verifiable. Verifi-
ability is restricted to that which can in principle be 
verified empirically, i.e., through sense perception. 
Since a proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence 
it can thereby be either true or false. However, its truth 
or falsity may never be known to human beings. For example, 
28Ethics, 115. 
29 Ibid., 115. 
consider the proposition expressed by "There is a finite 
amount of matter in the universe." Clearly, this proposi-
tion is either true or false, but it seems that only an 
omniscient being could know which it is. 
5. Self-Refutation 
30 
If the criterion that declarative sentences only 
have meaning if they are empirically verifiable in principle 
is to be applied to itself, it is nullified. What 
empirically verifiable principles does Ayer offer for his 
verifiability criterion of meaning? He has offered none. 
How are statements with respect to this theory empirically 
verifiable? Further, how can Ayer himself, by his own 
contentions, express any meaningful propositions to put 
forth his own emotive theory? 
One way in which the criticism that Ayer's verifi-
ability criterion is self-refuting is escaped is by the 
claim that it is analytic, that is, its "truth depends 
solely on its meaning," even though "it is neither self-
evident nor easy to establish. 1130 
3
°Fos ter, 5 . 
CHAPTER THREE 
CRITICISMS OF AYER'S EMOTIVISM 
A: MORE THAN A MERE SKEPTICISM 
Ayer goes further than reducing ethics to a mere 
skepticism. An ethical skepticism would contend that there 
is only one's impression versus another's with no way to 
know which one is correct since it is impossible to know a 
value by which to compare them. Ayer does not allow even 
for the opposition which is necessary for the suspension of 
judgment. No opposition is possible between "ooohh"'s and 
"aaahh"'s. 
B: AGAINST COMMON USAGE 
An obvious criticism which can be made against 
emotivism is that most people use value terms to express 
what they mean; this is one of the main purposes of sen-
tences containing such terms. When one says, "murder is 
wrong," one genuinely intends to ascribe a negative quality 
to murder. When another says, "whenever I hear about a 
murder I feel very badly," he is declaring how he feels. 
This is the same when one wants to convey or "evince" an 
emotion, as with the "Awww" which expresses disappointment 
when one's favorite baseball player misses an important 
catch or the "ooohh"'s and "aaahh"'s expressed during a 
31 
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fireworks display where for some, "ooohh" and "aaahh" is the 
best which they can do to express how they feel. Countless 
examples could be given, such as the "mmmmm" of a child with 
an ice cream sundae, etc. 
Normally when one desires to express one's emotions 
one usually introduces this with "I feel ... " or "I am ... " 
hungry, sad, happy, etc. Likewise, when one evinces an 
emotion one does so with a sigh or an exclamation, etc. 
When one states "'X' is wrong" or "'Y' is good," with re-
spect to any value, one is making a claim as to how 'X' or 
'Y' truly are in themselves, distinct from one's own person-
al feelings towards them and even regardless of one's rela-
tionship to them. 
The common person when speaking of "'A' being good" 
is asserting that 'A' is good regardless of any person's 
approach to it. As c. E. M. Joad explains in A Critique of 
Logical Positivism, the common person 
Believes that there are ethical qualities which really 
belong to 'objects' such as people, their characters, 
situations and lines of conduct, and that there are 
independent ethical principles by which these qualities 
can be judged and assessed. 1 
Thus, Joad concludes, in the pre-philosophical state, most 
people are "ethical objectivists," 2 that is, most people 
hold that there are objective ethical values. 
According to the logical positivists when one 
1Joad, 23. 
2 Ibid., 23. 
..J 
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asserts "'A' is good" one is saying nothing about 'A' nor 
even expressing a real proposition. One only articulates 
one's emotions about 'A'. Thus, the logical positivists 
claim that ordinary language such as "'A' is good" is really 
a misleading use of language. 
Ayer's analysis of the above mentioned "utterances" 
may be of some benefit to linguistics, philosophy, and the 
social sciences. However, to reduce meaningful sentences, 
such as, "You acted wrongly in stealing that mango," to 
"ooooh!!!" and "ahhhh!!!" is clearly going to far. 
C: THE MEANING AND THE EMOTIVE SENSE OF WORDS 
A valid point in Ayer's analysis of ethical state-
ments seems to be that there is indeed an important dis-
tinction between the meaning and the emotive sense of words; 
but in the case of ethical terms, as well as in the case of 
all value terms, Ayer neglects the meaning. Alice von 
Hildebrand explains the difference as follows: 
A word has both a meaning and an emotive sense, that 
is, atmosphere. There is a quality in the coinage of words 
such as beauty or vulgarity that accounts for their atmo-
sphere. Synonyms have the same meaning but may differ in 
atmosphere. For example, "William is a very fine person" is 
synonymous with "Bill is a swell guy." The first, however, 
has an atmosphere of reverence for the dignity of another 
while the second does not. With respect to scientific terms 
the atmosphere is neutralized, as in "William Smith is an 
exemplar of the homo sapien species." The choice of words 
does indeed betray one's outlook on life, as Alice von 
Hildebrand wittily comments, "Tell me how you speak and I 
will tell you the type of person you are." 3 
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c. s. Lewis also notes this point in his The Aboli-
tion of Man. In response to the growing empirical outlook 
of which emotivism is a product Lewis notes that by treating 
humans as mere specimens, language is certainly affected. 
He comments that 
Once we killed bad men: now we liquidate unsocial 
elements. Virtue has become integration and diligence 
dynamism, and boys likely to be worthy of a commission 
are "potential officer material." Most wonderful of 
all, the virtues of thrift and temperance, and even 
ordinary intelligence, are sales-resistance. 4 
Thus, by reducing all ethical words to their atmo-
sphere Ayer errs by ignoring the more substantial part of 
their meanings. As Max Black comments in Language and 
Philosophy, the focus upon the nonintellectual factors of 
ethical questions may be valuable, but such a focus fails 
"to do justice to the cognitive factors in ... ethical 
experience. " 5 
3The discussion in this paragraph is taken from the 
author's personal notes from a class lecture on Aesthetics 
given by Alice von Hildebrand on April 4, 1990 at the Fran-
ciscan University of Steubenville, Steubenville, Ohio. 
4Lewis, 84. 
5Max Black, Language and Philosophy: Studies in Method 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1949), 208. 
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Ayer also errs in holding that only neutral words, 
that is, words composing statements which are empirically 
verifiable, have meaning. Yes, they do have meaning, but 
they lack atmosphere. Atmosphere does have an important 
role in language, but it is absurd to reduce words to their 
atmosphere since without a meaning there is nothing for the 
atmosphere to modify. 
Max Black also notes this in Language and Philosophy 
where he says that to distinguish ''between 'emotive' and 
'scientific' or 'referential' uses of language is more than 
a technical puzzle." 6 It is important to make the distinc-
tion between those elements of language which truly are 
emotive and those which are merely interpreted to be emo-
tive. The emotive content that certain aspects of language 
do express, such as tone, rhythm, inflection, etc. should 
not lead to the interpretation that linguistic expressions 
are mere signs of the speaker's feelings. 
Accordingly, Black proposes that instead of reducing 
meaningful utterances to be solely emotive an effort should 
be made to explore the cognitive aspects of value judgments. 
He suggests that 
A reversal of emphasis, made possible by a fuller recog-
nition of the informative aspects of utterances, however 
charged with feeling, may encourage some, perhaps, to 
search further for a basis of rational agreement on 
ethical questions. 7 
6 Ibid., 203. 
7 Ibid., 220. 
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Clarity here would certainly bring about clarity 
with respect to many difficulties concerning ethics and 
emotions. By recognizing the problem of meaning one can 
break away from the erroneous ideas that the only _means of 
human communication is scientific discourse. 8 
D: MEANING IS NOT LIMITED TO EMPIRICAL VERIFIABILITY 
36 
Ayer holds that all meaningful propositions are of 
two classes: those which are in principle empirically veri-
fiable and those which are g priori, that is, tautologies. 
All assertions concerning metaphysics, that is, a realm of 
values or realities not immediately given to sense percep-
tion, are meaningless since they are not in principle empir-
ically verifiable. 
Ayer first assumes that all ethical assertions are 
empirical. However statements such as "this is good" cannot 
be empirically investigated since there is no sense-experi-
ence of goodness. Thus the statement "this is good" is 
meaningless since it cannot be empirically verified (and 
only that which is empirically verifiable is meaningful). 
Consequently, the significance of saying, "This is good," is 
reduced to a mere display of moral approval since the word 
"good" only signifies the emotional outlook of the speak-
er.9 By stating, "This is good," or for a more specific 
8 Ibid., 203. 
9Joad, 30. 
example, "Charity is good," one is not providing a true or 
false proposition because it is not a statement of fact. 
One is only providing an ejaculation of one's feelings 
concerning charity and saying nothing of charity in and of 
itself. 10 
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Ayer further errs by identifying meaning with that 
which can be shown to be either true or false. He fails to 
recognize that propositions, which are the meanings of 
declarative sentences, are only one type of meaning and that 
meaning is not limited to that which can be empirically 
shown to be true or false. All sentences express meaning: 
interrogative sentences express questions; imperative sen-
tences express commands; while declarative sentences express 
propositions. There are other types of meanings which 
language also expresses, such as: concepts; prayers; invi-
tations; hopes; promises; etc. Max Black points this out 
when he states that in emotivism: 
All referential discourse is treated as if it were 
assertion, and so necessarily either true or false. And 
if some use of language is patently not intended to have 
such truth claims (as is usually the case in litera-
ture), there seems no recourse but to relegate it to 
the realm of "emotive" or nonreferential utterance. 11 
Is it that ethical statements which are given as 
commands express a meaning which is not subject to truth or 
falsity (as is the case with the categorical imperative "Do 
10 Ibid., 30-31. 
11Black, 207. 
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not steal") or that they may be subject to truth or falsity 
(as the proposition expressed by "murder is good" seems to 
be clearly false), or possibly both? 12 Again, Max Black 
comments that: 
emphasis upon nonintellectual factors in aesthetic 
appreciation and ... questions of ethics are valuable. 
But they fail to do justice to the cognitive factors in 
aesthetic or ethical experience. 13 
E: ETHICAL DISPUTES 
As Ayer himself admits, his system allows for no 
argument which is based purely on values. Such arguments 
for Ayer would be impossible. In fact, Ayer is confident 14 
that not even one case, whether real or imaginary, of an 
argument on a question of value which is not reducible to 
questions of logic or to questions of facts can be demon-
strated. 
In response to this position, it is important to 
recognize that in the case of moral disputes the claim that 
ethical judgments are merely emotive expressions or persua-
sive incitements and that there can be no purely ethical 
12 It is based on criticisms similar to these that 
emotivism was refined to a later form advocated by Charles 
L. Stevenson. As was noted in the introduction, the emo-
tivism which Stevenson proposes is of great importance to 
this area of study but an in depth look at his work goes 
beyond the scope of this study. However, the interested 
reader could examine Stevenson's thought as found in Ethics 
and Language ana in Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical 
Analysis, among other works. 
13 Black, 208. 
14Ayer, Language, 112. 
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argument overlooks the purpose people engage in such 
arguments. It is not merely to evince their emotions or to 
influence the opposing party to adopt their sentiments, but 
rather as Sir David Ross proposes, 
What they are attempting to do by the process Mr. Ayer 
describes is to convince each other that the liking, or 
the dislike, is justified, in other words that the act 
has a character that deserves to be liked or disliked, 
is good or is bad." 15 
Despite Ayer's negligence concerning the purpose 
people engage in arguments concerning values, he does admit 
that if G. E. Moore's argument that people do indeed dispute 
over questions of value refutes the subjectivists' position 
then it refutes his position as well. Sir David Ross notes 
the importance of this issue when he comments that if things 
truly were disputed which under Ayer's theory cannot be 
disputed, "his theory would clearly be untrue. " 16 Ayer is 
forced to deny that there are disputes solely about value 
which he justifies by claiming that apparent disputes about 
values are really disputes about logic or questions of 
facts. 
In agreement with Ayer it is easy to find many 
examples which appear to be disputes concerning values but 
are really disputes of facts. Fritz Wenisch of The 
15 S ir David Ross, "Critique of Ayer," in Readings in 
Ethical Theory, ed. by Wilfred Sellars and John Hospers (New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), 404. 
16 Ibid., 403. 
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University of Rhode Island offers as an example the discus-
sions of abortion. He explains: 
Often, both parties would agree that taking of innocent 
human life is wrong; but they disagree whether or not 
abortion is the taking of innocent human life. Their 
disagreement does not revolve around an ethical princi-
ple, but it concerns the nature of life between concep-
tion and birth. The person taking the pro-choice view 
would usually agree to the statement: "If the unborn 
would be a member of the human community, abortion would 
be morally wrong in most cases." The opponent of abor-
tion would usually agree to the statement: "If the 
unborn would not be a member of the human community, 
abortion would in many cases be morally permissible. 1117 
Such examples of disputes over facts may be found in 
abundance. However, the crucial question is, "Can there be 
a dispute based solely on values?" More specifically, "Are 
there moral arguments which are not reducible to matters of 
fact or questions of logic?" 
As an example Wenisch offers the following 
intriguing question: 
Is it morally permissible to state something which is 
literally untrue with the intention to deceive the one 
to whom one speaks in order to save another from being 
murdered (may I state to a Nazi that there are no Jews 
hidden in my house in order to save them)? 18 
This question is one which offers an opportunity for 
much discussion. All involved may be in agreement with 
respect to all the relevant facts and the questions of 
logic. They may agree that it does not matter whether the 
question is phrased as: 
17 Fri tz Wenisch, "Critical Comment" ( Kingston Rhode 
Island: unpublished document, 1993). 
18 Ibid. 
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"Is it permitted under certain circumstances to say 
something that is literally untrue with the intention to 
deceive," or "Is it permitted under some circumstances 
to tell a lie? " 19 
Yet, even with this agreement the moral debate may 
meaningfully continue .. 
A second dispute which may be of interest involves 
the question: "Is it morally licit to cause a minor amount 
of pain to an innocent human being without the person's con-
sent in order to prevent a much greater evil, such as the 
unjust death of many people?" All involved in this discus-
sion may agree on all the points of logic and matters of 
fact but still are able to continue a meaningful discussion. 
Thus, not only one but two examples of moral dis-
putes which cannot be reduced to matters of logic or of fact 
have been provided and Ayer is refuted on his own terms. 
F: CONSEQUENCES OF EMOTIVISM 
Once the consequences of emotivism are examined it 
becomes clear that the results are at best formidable. Joad 
illustrates this with the following example: 
Again, if there is no objective right and wrong, if 
moral judgments are, as logical positivists hold, merely 
ejaculations of emotions of approval and disapproval, 
then, as Mr. Dunham points out, one cannot demonstrate 
that fascist practices are evil; one can only express 
dislike for them. "No philosophy," he comments, "would 
better please the fascists themselves, since moral 
questions could then be safely left in the hands of the 
police. 1120 
19 Ibid. 
20 Joad, 148. 
Ironically, in seeking to rationalize everything, 
logical positivism actually denies that which is most 
reasonable. Joad contends that logical positivism 
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like Radical Empiricism ... dispenses with~ priori 
knowledge, repudiates the notion of necessary connexion, 
eschews absolutes and denies metaphysics, while present-
ing factual statements about the empirical world as 
hypotheses. 21 
Joad offers as an example, a discussion of the 
miracles of Christ, specifically, the changing of water into 
wine at the wedding at Cana (John 2). The actual miracle is 
empirically verifiable. Yet the cause of this change, which 
is due to Christ being the supernatural Son of God and 
thereby having supernatural powers, is unverifiable and 
therefore meaningless. In fact, all reasonable explanations 
for the changing of water into wine are eliminated. 
The uneasiness about a miraculous phenomenon without 
a reasonable cause can only lead one to deny that the empir-
ically verifiable miracle ever happened. 22 Ironically 
logical positivism backfires, as Joad explains: 
For the empirical world contains nothing but the move-
ments of matter and these, though they can be observed, 
cannot be believed. It is thus no accident that Logical 
Positivism tends to undermine rational and to encourage 
irrational beliefs. 23 
By adhering to Ayer's theory that value terms add 
nothing literal to statements one is faced with absurd 
21 Ibid., 143. 
22 Ibid., 146. 
23 Ibid. , 152. 
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situations. For example, as Joad so poignantly illustrates: 
If Logical Positivism is correct, you can say, "one atom 
bomb can destroy 50,000 people" (statement of fact), but 
not, "it is a bad thing to destroy 50,000 people" 
(statement of evaluation) or, rather, you can say it, 
but the "word 'bad' adds nothing to the factual content 
of the statement 11 • 24 
The influence of logical positivism has lead many to 
believe that there are no absolutes, that the study of 
metaphysics is nonsensical, that only scientific inquiry 
gives valid results, and that the only order of being is 
that which can be known empirically. 25 In short, for 
logical positivism, metaphysics is nonsensical and value 
judgments are meaningless. 26 Through logical positivism 
the Forms of Plato, the traditional values, the True, 
the Beautiful and the Good, the demonstrated God of 
Leibnitz and Descartes, the Absolute of Hegel and the 
subsistent objects of the conceptual realists are con-
temptuously dismissed. 27 
All questions of metaphysics are dismissed by the logical 
positivists as not being worthy of the intellectual con-
sideration of men. Is this not an affront to so many noble 
men from Plato to Hegel? 
Joad explains that by adhering to emotivism, 
ethics goes the way of metaphysics .... It is because 
there is no meaning in things, or, at least, no meaning 
that philosophy can discern, that we cannot ascribe a 
24 Ibid. , 148. 
25 Ibid. , 10. 
26 Ibid., 9 • 
27 Ibid. , 10-11. 
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purpose to human existence; ... God, freedom and 
immortality are subjects which it is fruitless to dis-
cuss because the terms of the discussion are meaning-
less. 28 
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Eliminating, God, ethics, values, freedom, immor-
tality, etc. from being appropriate topics of discussion and 
consideration just to have a more favorable analysis of the 
meaning of linguistic expressions is a grave modification. 
As Joad notes, "the change involved in substituting for the 
understanding of the universe the better understanding of 
certain sentences is no minor change. 1129 
G: SELF-ANNIHILATING 
Joad proposes that in accepting the emotive theory 
one is denying "emotive significance" to both ethics and 
religion. 30 Joad takes as a demonstration the statement, 
"God is Love," to be an emotional expression "of love and 
reverence. " 31 Yet once logical positivism is introduced 
"God" falls into the non-existent via the nonsensical and it 
now seems absurd that one could have any emotion for that 
which is non-existent. Joad concludes that "if I believe 
that the statement 'God is Love' is purely emotive, then it 
ceases, for me, to express emotion. " 32 The same too could 
28 Ibid. , 30. 
29 Ibid. , 18. 
30 Ibid., 145. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 146. 
be said of goodness in "'X' is good" for if it is only 
emotive it ceases to say anything of 'X'. 
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Once ethical statements such as "murder is wrong" 
are considered merely to be emotive and only expressions of 
the speaker's disapproval of murder or of his emotion of 
disdain, then the statement will no longer have the effect 
of giving rise to that emotion. Once the "wrongness" is 
emotivized there ceases to be that which gives rise to the 
emotion. Eventually one will no longer believe that murder 
is wrong. 33 As Joad questions, 
Can a man really continue to feel indignant at cruelty, 
if he is convinced that the statement, "cruelty is 
wrong" is meaningless? An emotion of indignation may, 
indeed, be felt; it may even be expressed; but it will 
not long survive the conviction that it is without 
authority in morals or basis in reason. 34 
Thus emotivism annihilates itself, and tragically brings the 
world of values down with it. 
34 Ibid., 148. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
VON HILDEBRAND'S CRITIQUE OF AYER'S EMOTIVISM 
Since this study is comparing Ayer's emotivism with 
Dietrich von Hildebrand's theory of affective morality, it 
is highly interesting to examine von Hildebrand's critique 
of Ayer's emotivism. 
In his Ethics, Dietrich von Hildebrand considers 
Ayer's emotive theory to be just another form of value 
subjectivism, where Ayer holds that statements of value 
judgments do not refer to one's emotions but merely are 
expressions of one's emotions or are issuances of one's 
commands. 
A: CLARIFYING TERMS 
Von Hildebrand offers some clarity to Ayer's ambigu-
ous usage of certain crucial terms. First of all, he points 
out the vagueness of Ayer's term "expression of feelings." 
The word "feeling" itself could have various referents, from 
physical hunger or fatigue to emotional anguish or angst. 1 
Ayer fails to give clarity to what he exactly means by 
"feeling." Equal in obscurity is Ayer's use of the term 
"expression." 
1A more elaborate discussion on feelings is given in 
chapter five of this work. 
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1. Expression 
With respect to "expression," von Hildebrand states 
that the most authentic meaning of this "term refers to the 
intuitively given transparence of psychical entities in a 
person's face or in his voice or movements." 2 Under this 
meaning von Hildebrand contends that it is impossible to 
equate any value judgment with an expression. 
An exterior display of one's emotions is a second 
meaning von Hildebrand notes for the term "expression," such 
as tears which may express sadness or the expression of con-
tentment given by whistling. Many linguistic expressions 
may under this definition be expressions of one's emotions 
whether joy or sorrow or jubilation, etc., such as: "Too 
bad," "How wonderful," "Oh boy," etc. Such words or 
sentences which function as exterior representations of 
one's subjective experiences are completely different in 
character from those sentences which express propositions. 
Ayer reduces value judgments to be this type of expression. 
Von Hildebrand explains that expressions in the 
second sense are merely projections of one's psychical 
experiences and, strictly speaking, are without meaning. 
They are only manifested in a process of dynamic and active 
exteriorization. With respect to expressions, von Hilde-
brand maintains, 
the primary experience is an emotion, e.g., joy, sorrow, 
2Ethics, 123. 
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fear; and the words we utter as expression of th~s 
experience can in no way be interpreted as the formula-
tion of something we perceived before as the property of 
an object .... They are an exteriorization of some-
thing, having no meaning in the strict sense, indicating 
no object, but having only the character of a projection 
of a psychical experience. They speak exclusively of 
the psychical entity whose expression they are; they 
manifest univocally the nature and presence of joy, 
sorrow, or fear. 3 
For example, one may be deeply affected to the point 
of tears by the beauty of a piece of music, such as Stephen 
Schwarz speaks of Mozart's Ave Verum. It is clear that 
one's being so moved is distinctly separate from the beauty 
of the music. Von Hildebrand explains: 
We are moved to tears because of the beauty of a 
work of art. Our being so affected is clearly distin-
guished therefore from the beauty of the object. How 
should the expression of our emotion be identical with 
beauty? Or how could one pretend that in saying that 
this work of art is beautiful, we are in reality not 
stating a fact but merely expressing our reaction? 4 
It would be completely erroneous to identify the 
beauty of the object with the expression of one's emotions, 
such as a sigh or tears. It would equally be wrong to claim 
that by one's saying, "This music is beautiful," one is not 
referring to the music but merely expressing one's personal 
reaction to it. Yet, Ayer holds that value judgments are 
these types of expression. 
Von Hildebrand argues that Ayer's theory of value 
judgments being mere expressions of emotions or of commands 
3 Ibid., 124. 
1 
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is "in blatant contradiction to experience." 5 Von Hilde-
brand's opposition to emotivism is based (as was noted 
earlier) on his maintaining that "the fact that something is 
endowed with a value is at the basis of every true moral 
norm. 116 
Von Hildebrand explains that the value of an object 
exists independently of a person's perception of it. It is 
first the recognition of the existence of the value that 
allows a person to make a judgment so as to attribute the 
value to the object. Von Hildebrand explains: 
The moral nobility of an act of charity is clearly given 
as a property of the act, as something on the object's 
side, definitely distinguished from any psychical 
happening in the soul. 
Our primary contact with values is in no way a judg-
ment; it is not the act of imparting a property to an 
object but the perception of something autonomous. The 
original experience is the perception of the importance 
of an object; only after this initial disclosure of the 
value may we by a judgment attribute it to an object. 7 
2. Feelings 
Von Hildebrand points out that what Ayer means by 
"feelings" are not "mere states, such as fatigue, irrita-
tion, depression, which are only caused by an object but, 
not motivated by it," 8 whose outward manifestation is the 
authentic sense of expression. Rather "what Ayer means by 
6 Ibid., 128. 
7 Ibid. , 124. 
8 Ibid., 125. 
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the term 'feeling' comes under the heading of intentional 
experiences, experience having a meaningful conscious rela-
tion to an object," 9 such as love, hope, fear, enthusiasm, 
admiration, indignation, contempt, hatred, sorrow, joy, etc. 
B: THE NATURE OF INTENTIONAL ACTS 
To disclose the futility of emotivism von Hildebrand 
proposes an examination of intentional acts of which Ayer's 
"feelings" are one type. The intentional nature of feel-
ings, that is, their character of being a meaningful re-
sponse, necessarily presupposes the knowledge of an object 
which is the reason for the emotion, whether it be joy or 
sorrow, etc. If an object is presented as being neutral, 
that is, without importance, such responses would be impos-
sible. It is therefore completely erroneous to attribute 
one's affective responses as being the source of the ob-
ject's value. On the contrary, the affective responses 
essentially presuppose the knowledge of the object's 
value. 1° For example, 
There is no enthusiasm, no veneration, no esteem as 
such .... Every veneration is essentially a veneration 
of someone; every enthusiasm, an enthusiasm about some-
thing; every esteem, the esteem for a person .... The 
feelings to which, according to this theory, the values 
must be reduced, themselves presuppose an importance on 
9 Ibid. Intentional here is not meant as "on purpose" but 
rather in the philosophical sense of being in a conscious 
relation to an object. 
10 Ibid. 
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the object side. 11 
Von Hildebrand points out that emotivism fails to 
recognize "the radical difference which separates the con-
sciousness of something, the awareness of an object and its 
quality, from our response to it." 12 Ayer overlooks the 
obvious difference between the "content of the quality on 
the side of the object (which we term 'beautiful,' 'sub-
lime,' 'heroic,' 'noble,' and so forth) " 13 and "the content 
of our responses, such as joy, enthusiasm, love, admiration, 
esteem, and so on. 11114 
Ayer is thus making the mistake of confusing the 
principium with the principiatum. 15 His theory begs the 
question or, in laymen's terms, puts the cart before the 
horse. For example, in stating that "charity is good" von 
Hildebrand notes that there is a 
connection between both facts - the goodness and the 
command to goodness ... such that the goodness is the 
principium and the command, the principiatum. Thus, it 
is impossible to substitute the command for the value, 
because the command, as soon as it is a moral command 
and not a mere positive commandment ... necessarily 
presupposes the value of the object to which it 
refers. 16 
11 Ibid. ' 125-126. 
12 Ibid., 126. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid • 1 127-128. 
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C: ILLICIT INTERPRETATIONS 
Von Hildebrand notes the absurdity of interpreting 
such statements as "Handel's Messiah is beautiful," or "A 
rock has a lower value than the human person," or "Truth is 
something worthy of esteem," as commands. He explains: 
If one would say it is a command to appreciate this 
music, or to respect the human person, or to worship 
truth, the question-begging character of such a view is 
obvious. Not only does one definitely mean something 
else, but the very reason for commanding such a response 
is precisely the value of the object. This involves the 
same confusion as if one would say, "It is true that 
Caesar was murdered in 43 B.C.," and make this statement 
synonymous with the command to be convinced of it. 17 
Similarly, by stating that murder is evil one is 
referring to a property of the act of murdering. One is not 
expressing a prohibition nor does one even refer to a prohi-
bition. However, there is the stating of a fact which is 
the basis for the prohibition and which logically entails 
the prohibition. 18 
17 Ibid., 127. 
18 Ibid. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE AFFECTIVE SPHERE OF MORALITY 
A: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
In this Chapter, Dietrich von Hildebrand's analysis 
of the sphere of affectivity, that is, the realm of the 
emotions, shall be examined. The purpose of this is to show 
an alternative to Ayer's emotivism. Special emphasis will 
be placed on what von Hildebrand calls "sanction and 
disavowal." 
For von Hildebrand, sanction and disavowal of one's 
affective responses are an exercise of a person's deepest 
freedom; his explanation of their nature may therefore be 
considered as an important development in ethical theory. 
The following discussion will begin with an explanation of 
"the heart" as denoting the affective sphere and with an 
analysis of the nature of the affective response; this will 
be followed by an examination of freedom, true sanction and 
disavowal, moral consciousness and moral unconsciousness, 
and the pseudo-sanction. 
B: THE AFFECTIVE SPHERE IN GENERAL 
This study is to start out with an explanation of 
the affective sphere, that is, the realm of emotions. 
Von Hildebrand begins his work on the affective 
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sphere, The Heart, by addressing the all too frequent 
omission of the affective sphere not only from ethics, but 
from philosophical study all together. He contends that 
even though 
it is understandable that the affective sphere is 
looked at with some suspicion because there are many 
forms of ungenuineness to be found within that sphere, 
it is not difficult to see that this suspicion gives 
rise to a typical prejudice. But while prejudices are 
often understandable psychologically, they are no less 
unjustifiable. 1 
He further maintains that, 
From a philosophical point of view, there is no 
excuse for discrediting the affective sphere and the 
heart merely because these are exposed to so many 
perversions and deviations. And if it is true that in 
the sphere of the intellect or of the will ungenuineness 
plays no analogous role, still the harm wrought by wrong 
or false theories is even more sinister and disastrous 
than the ungenuineness of feelings. 2 
The place of the affective sphere must be acknowl-
edged to be of equal importance with that of the will and 
the intellect in the human person. It must be admitted 
"that in man there exists a triad of spiritual centers -
intellect, will and heart - which are ordained to cooperate 
and to fecundate one another." 3 The affective center is 
distinct from the other two centers and cannot be either 
neglected or reduced to one of the other centers. Von 
1Dietrich von Hildebrand, The Heart (Chicago: Francis-
can Herald Press, 1977), 41. Future references will be 
given as Heart. 
3 Ibid., 46. 
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Hildebrand explains that "affectivity is a great reality in 
man's life, a reality which cannot be subsumed under intel-
lect or will." 4 This center of affectivity is ordinarily 
referred to as the "heart." 
"Heart" seems to be a general term for the realm of 
the emotions. For the purpose of philosophical study an 
analysis of its meanings must be worked out. 
Von Hildebrand explains that "heart" is used in one 
sense of the word as a designation of the interior life of a 
person, that is, of the whole conscious personal self. It 
is a "representative of the entire interiority of man." 5 
In this sense, the heart is also often identified with the 
soul. 
Similar to the intellect being the center of all 
epistemological activities, and the will being the center of 
all volitional activities of the person, in the second sense 
the heart is designated as being the center of all of a 
person's affective activities. In this narrower sense, the 
heart may be considered to be "the center of affectivity, 
the very core of this sphere." 6 In this sense, heart is 
referred to as the core of all affectivity with "the 
connotation of being the very center of gravity of all 
4 Ibid. , 4 8. 
5 Ibid., 47. 
6 Ibid., 48. 
affecti vi ty. " 7 In this sense, "all wishing, all desiring, 
all 'being affected,' all kinds of happiness and sorrow" 8 
are attributed to the heart. 
Von Hildebrand proposes that 
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To see the role and rank of the heart and of the affec-
tive sphere in its highest manifestations, we have to 
look at man's life, at his quest for earthly happiness, 
at his religious life, at the lives of the saints, at 
the Gospel and the liturgy. 9 
The most profound source of human happiness is 
considered by von Hildebrand to be deep true "mutual love 
between persons, 1110 whether it be the love between friends 
or the love between spouses. Other forms of love may also 
be considered here, such as parental love, filial love, 
fraternal love and possibly neighborly love. 11 He claims 
7 Ibid., 49. 
8Ibid. , 4 8. 
9 Ibid., 42. Von Hildebrand often illustrates his 
philosophical points with religious examples. To be true to 
his writings these examples will be given as well as others 
which the author deems as appropriate. There is a danger 
that a reader who may be opposed to religion as a nonsensi-
cal fabrication may miss the importance of the philosophical 
points being made. With the realization that some readers 
may find the religious examples to be poor examples, the 
author asks that such readers make the extra effort to 
examine the philosophical point in question regardless of 
their religious depictions. It is thus suggested for the 
"objective" reader to consider the philosophical point as a 
point of philosophy and not as theological propaganda. 
10 Ibid. 
11The inclusion of these additional forms of love which 
von Hildebrand does not specifically mention in The Heart were 
suggested by Dr. Stephen Schwarz, a noted von Hildebrand 
scholar. 
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that love itself is the most affective of all the affective 
responses. It pervades all great works of art including 
poetry, music, literature, painting, etc. In emphasizing 
this truth, he quotes Leonardo da Vinci as saying: "The 
greater the man, the deeper his love. 1112 
Even if the role of love is disregarded and regard-
less of what is considered to be the main source of human 
happiness, whether it be knowledge, truth, beauty, righ-
teousness, etc., happiness itself belongs to the affective 
sphere. Von Hildebrand makes this clear when he decisively 
states that "it is the heart which experiences happiness, 
and not the intellect or the will. " 13 
C: CLARITY WITH RESPECT TO AFFECTIVE RESPONSES 
Within the affective sphere a distinction must be 
made between the affective response and that with which it 
may be confused, namely a person's being affected, bodily 
feelings, and mere psychic states which a person may 
experience. 
1. Intentionality 
All affective responses, as well as all volitional 
responses, and theoretical responses, have an intentional 14 
12 Heart, 42-43. 
13 Ibid., 43. 
14 Intentional here is used in the given philosophical 
sense and not in its common non-philosophical sense of "on 
purpose." 
!" 
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character, that is, they have "a meaningful conscious 
relation of the person to an object. " 15 They are all di-
rected towards something and imply the presence of rational 
structure. 
There must be an intelligible and meaningful 
relation between one's affective response and the state of 
affairs which motivates it. By presupposing the knowledge 
of an object and its importance, "the process by which the 
object in its importance engenders the response is itself a 
conscious one, a process which goes through the spiritual 
realm of the person. 1116 
By their intentional nature, affective responses 
presuppose an object and are always in reference this 
object. It is therefore essential that before one can 
respond, or give a response, one must first be presented 
with an object of importance to which one can respond. 17 
Von Hildebrand explains that "it is this object which must 
enkindle our response. 1118 
Consequently, if an object were presented as being 
neutral, that is, without value, such responses would be 
impossible. This is the basis for the psychoanalysts' 
theory of repression. Freud held that there had to be a 
15 Ethics, 293. 
16 Heart, 55. 
17 Ethics, 318. 
18 Ibid. , 319 . 
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corresponding cause to the emotional and psychological 
reactions of people. If no cause were consciously known he 
believed that the cause had to be in the person's subcon-
science. As von Hildebrand notes, Freud "considers 
certain motivations as abnormal and refuses to accept in 
these cases the consciously admitted object as being the 
authentic one. 1119 
It would thus be completely erroneous to attribute 
one's affective responses as being the source of an object's 
value, since the affective responses essentially presuppose 
the knowledge of the object's value. 20 
To this extent, all affective responses are motivat-
ed. As von Hildebrand elucidates, affective responses are 
precisely responses, "motivated by the importance of the ob-
ject. 1121 Authentic affective responses are only produced 
by motivation and never by mere causation. Von Hildebrand 
explains that: 
Real joy necessarily implies not only the consciousness 
of an object about which we are rejoicing, but also an 
awareness that it is this object which is the reason for 
this joy. 22 
This radically differs from the jolly mood which may be 
caused by the consumption of wine . 
19 Ibid., 26. 
20 Ibid., 125. 
21 Ibid., 319. 
22 Heart, 54. 
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Affective responses may have effects on the body due 
to the intimate connection between the body and the soul. 
For example, an affective response such as deep sorrow may 
lead to weeping. However, these two experiences are not 
equivalent nor can bodily processes engender associated 
affective responses. Accordingly, affective responses are 
motivated and are "neither engendered nor dissolved by our 
free intervention. 1123 
Through the affective response one is able to give 
oneself with one's heart, that is, with the fullness of 
one's whole personality. 24 Von Hildebrand states, "In 
affective responses the heart and the plentitude of a human 
personality are actualized. 1125 
Accordingly, one is responsible for one~s own affec-
tive responses. For example, one is responsible for whether 
or not one gives the right, due, adequate response of sorrow 
at the death of a parent. 26 
2. Being Affected 
While affective responses arise in a person sponta-
neously, being affected is something which is bestowed on a 
person. Being affected has the characteristic of being 
23 Ethics, 326. 
24 Ibid. , 320 . 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 312. 
,,. 
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something that is given to the person. Being affected lies 
between cognitive acts and affective responses and has an 
intentional nature. For example, one's being affected, such 
as when one is humbled before the wondrous workings of 
nature, follows the cognitive act, in this case the recogni-
tion of the grandeur of nature, and precedes one's affective 
response, such as reverence, awe, and possibly joy. 
3. Bodily Feelings 
Bodily feelings, such as fatigue, pain, natural 
urges and instincts, are not just physiological but have the 
aspect of being conscious experiences. Von Hildebrand 
explains that: 
They are in some way the "voice" of our body. They form 
the center of our body-experience, that which most 
pointedly affects us, and is the most awakened and most 
conscious. " 27 
However, bodily experiences radically differ from one's 
affective responses. This is easily seen when one compares 
a headache to heart-felt sorrow. 
4. Mere Psychic States 
Psychic states or feelings are non-bodily feelings 
and come in a great variety. For example, there is the 
joviality of slight intoxication or the listlessness of a 
state of depression. These are not states or voices of the 
body although they may co-exist or be interpenetrated with 
27 Heart, 50-51. 
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bodily experiences, for example there is the "runner's high" 
which is a euphoric state which some runners experience. 
Mere psychic states are neither intentional nor 
motivated but are merely caused, 28 and also lack the above 
mentioned qualities of affective responses. They are not 
conscious meaningful positions which one takes towards an 
object as one takes in the case of an affective response, 
such as remorse, desire, love, sorrow, etc., and they there-
by lack the character of being responses. This lack of 
intentionality clearly distinguishes psychic states as being 
non-spiritual. Such states should never be equivocated with 
spiritual affectivity under the ambiguous title of 
"feelings. " 29 
Psychic states have a character of irrationality and 
fluctuation, which is a result of the body-soul connection. 
Mood swings from exuberance to melancholy are not uncommon 
and may change like the weather. 30 In psychic states, the 
"unreliability," the transitory and fleeting character 
unjustly ascribed to "feelings" in general is really 
present. They do indeed have a wavering character. They 
are the results of a person's weakness, vulnerability, and 
exposure to irrational influences. 31 
28 Ethics, 293. 
29 Heart, 54. 
30 Ibid., 55-56. 
31 Ibid. , 5 6 . 
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5. The Use of the Word "Feeling" 
With these distinctions, one can see that it is a 
serious error to equivocate the word "feeling" as referring 
both to psychic states such as jolliness or depression and 
to spiritual affective responses such as joy over a friend's 
engagement or sorrow for another's loss of employment. 32 
Unfortunately this equivocation of "feeling" to affective 
responses, being affected, bodily feelings, and mere 
psychic states has led many to consider all four as being 
irrational. With respect to affective responses and being 
affected this is completely unjustified. 
D: FREEDOM 
Von Hildebrand clearly states: "Morality extends as 
far as does responsibility"; 33 "A man is responsible only 
for something which he can freely choose or refuse, some-
thing which in one way or another is within the range of his 
power"; 34 "Moral values presuppose a free being, . freedom is 
an essential feature of the person"; 35 and "Our will alone 
is free. " 36 This leads to the question: "In what sense is 
one responsible for one's affective responses?" To answer 
32 Ibid. , 54. 
33 Ethics, 282. 
34 lbid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 301. 
this question, the topic of freedom in general must be 
addressed. 
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In speaking of freedom von Hildebrand comments that 
"Freedom is one of the greatest of man's privileges." 37 It 
is as essential a characteristic of the person as is a 
person's capacity for knowledge. "A person who is not free 
would be an intrinsic impossibility. " 38 
In his Ethics von Hildebrand provides an analysis of 
freedom. He offers various distinctions concerning the 
freedom of the will. For the purpose of this study, first 
the distinction he makes between the two perfections of the 
will which he also refers to as the two dimensions of 
freedom will be examined and secondly cooperative freedom 
will be presented. 
1. The First Dimension of Freedom 
He speaks of the first dimension of freedom, the 
deeper internal freedom, as being one's freedom to take a 
specific position towards an object. One may either allow 
oneself to be motivated by an object or not. It is a 
volitional response since it is the will's decision to 
conform to an object or not to conform to it. An example of 
the use of one's first dimension of freedom is when one 
wills to love one's enemies. It has the volitional element 
37 Ibid., 283. 
38 Ibid., 282. 
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of responding with a "yes" or "no" to a given reality. 
2. The Second Dimension of Freedom 
The external freedom, which von Hildebrand desig-
nates as the second dimension of freedom, is the will's 
capacity to bring about a change in one's surroundings or in 
the contemporary state of affairs. It is in this perfection 
of the will that one may utilize the command one has over 
one's body as well as envision a future state of affairs 
which is realizable through one's own actions. This second 
dimension of freedom is what accounts for a person's ability 
to initiate a causal chain of events. 
Of the other different topics which von Hildebrand 
examines, the one of greatest significance to this discus-
sion is cooperative freedom. 
3. Cooperative Freedom 
Cooperative freedom is the freedom one exerts in 
taking a position towards experiences existing in one's own 
soul. This is distinct from the two perfections of the will 
which are directed externally. Cooperative freedom is 
inwardly directed. This is the 
freedom of taking a position toward experiences wh ich 
have come into existence without our free intervention, 
and which also cannot be dissipated by our free 
influence. 39 
It is the cooperative activity of one's free spiritual 
39 Ibid., 316. 
center. As an example of cooperative freedom, von 
Hildebrand offers the way in which a person accepts bodily 
pain. However, it is with respect to the realm of one's 
being affected and particularly the realm of affective 
responses that cooperative freedom has "its greatest moral 
significance. 1140 
E: COOPERATION OF ONE'S FREE SPIRITUAL CENTER 
66 
Without the cooperation of one's free spiritual 
center, that is, the use of one's cooperative freedom, 
giving assent or dissent to an affective response, the 
response has an accidental characte~. This accidental 
quality may be based on ones's temperament or mood at a 
given time, although one's personal character and lasting 
personal characteristics do contribute to the response one 
may give. For an affective response to be a valid moral 
response, there must not only be an awareness of a specific 
moral significance which is present and a response to 
this moral significance, accompanied by the general super-
actual will to be good, but there must also be the total 
collaboration of one's free spiritual center. It is only 
the cooperation of one's free spiritual center which, as von 
Hildebrand explains, 
can fully make the response a real "concerting" with the 
value, and this alone renders justice to the majesty of 
the value, for it calls for an adequate response 
independently of our natural inclination to give this 
40 Ibid. 
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response . or to fail to do so. 41 
c. s. Lewis, in The Abolition of Man, similarly 
notes that 
emotional states can be in harmony with reason {when we 
feel liking for what ought to be approved) or out of 
harmony with reason {when we perceive that liking is due 
but cannot feel it) .... they can be reasonable or 
unreasonable as they conform to Reason or fail to 
conform. The heart never takes the place of the head: 
but it can, and should, obey it. 0 
It is through the use of one's cooperative freedom 
that one is able to sanction one's affective responses or 
disavow them. 
F: SANCTION AND DISAVOWAL 
C. S. Lewis explains that: 
all men believed the universe to be such that certain 
emotional reactions on our part could be either congru-
ous or incongruous to it .... that certain responses 
could be more 'just' or 'ordinate' or 'appropriate' to 
it than others . 43 
It is to these "emotional reactions," or in von Hildebrand's 
words, "affective responses," that sanction and disavowal 
are applied; the appropriate responses are sanctioned while 
the inappropriate ones are disavowed. Consequently, 
sanction and disavowal are at the core of the sphere of 
moral affectivity. Likewise, sanction and disavowal play a 
crucial role in the relationship of ethics and emotions. 
41 Ibid., 323. 
42 Lewis, 29-30. 
43 Ibid. , 25. 
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1. Sanction 
Sanctioning a response endows the response "with a 
new, decisive character. " 44 The response becomes one's 
very own in a deeper sense by one's sanctioning it. Through 
sanctioning, one's free spiritual center gives consent to 
one's affective response and in a sense identifies with it. 
Von Hildebrand elucidates this in stating: "In sanctioning , 
an affective response, we join it with our free spiritual 
center, we place ourselves in this response, forming it from 
'within. '" 45 In sanctioning an affective response one 
gives the response the most clear stamp of conscious approv-
al possible. The affective response is joined at its core 
with the sanction, not at all lessening one's free coopera-
tion with it, but rather forming one homogeneous response. 
Through sanctioning, one's being affected takes on 
the full character which would otherwise only be simulated. 
Sanctioning makes an affective response into one's own free 
position even though the response's "plentitude is not 
something which we can give to ourselves, but which is 
granted to us. " 46 Von Hildebrand explains: "Only the 
sanctioned response can be considered as a fully awakened 
response; it is the only fully conscious free response. " 47 
44 Ethics, 323. 
45 Ibid., 324. 
46 Ibid., 325. 
47 Ibid., 324. 
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Only in sanctioning does a person give a fully conscious 
response to the object or state of affairs being presented. 
A response, although sincere and possibly intense 
still has the character of being "blind" if it is not in 
full conscious conformity to the value at hand. For an 
affective value response to be free from any accidental 
character there must be a "real conscious conforming to the 
value which is precisely demanded by values. " 48 
For example, the righteous anger over injustice or 
the sorrow over a tragedy presuppose the person's acknowl-
edgement of the value at hand. Not only does one recognize 
the value but one recognizes it so much so that one is 
"moved" to give the full and appropriate response. For 
example, as C. s. Lewis explains, 
to call children delightful or old men venerable is not 
simply to record a psychological fact about our own 
parental or filial emotions at the moment, but to recog-
nize a quality which demands a certain response from us 
whether we make it or not . 49 
By its nature, sanction is not given "to morally 
unobjectionable responses which are not value responses. 1150 
In sanctioning one does not give endorsement simply with 
"let it be," as if from without, but rather one identifies 
one's free spiritual center, that is, one's heart, with 
the value response and grants it a decisive significance 
48 lbid., 331. 
49 Lewis, 29. 
50 Ethics, 330. 
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from within. 51 
2. Disavowal 
In contrast to the sanctioning of an affective value 
response is the disavowal of a response which is contrary 
to a value response, that is, an inappropriate or evil re-
sponse. While sanction is only possible with respect to 
adequate affective value responses, disavowal is only possi-
ble with respect to affective responses which are inadequate 
to their objects. According to von Hildebrand: 
In this disavowal the person emancipates himself ex-
pressly from this affective response and counteracts it 
with his free spiritual center; he withdraws from it in 
such a way that he desubstantializes the response, 
"decapitates" it, so to speak. In this disavowal the 
free "no" affects the response from within and takes 
from it its character of a valid position toward the 
object." 52 
Disavowal does not completely uproot an undesired 
affective response from one's heart but rather it modifies 
it substantially. It is only by an arduous process that the 
response can be eradicated. Von Hildebrand refers to it as 
"the process of a moral transformation of our nature. " 53 
Without disavowal by a person's free spiritual 
center an affective response assumes the character of 
involving the whole person and takes on the appearance of 
being the person's true position towards the immediately 
51 Ibid., 331. 
52 Ibid. , 322. 
53 Ibid., 323. 
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presented object. 
With full sanction and disavowal the morally 
conscious person's ethical statements are "emotive" in that 
they do express emotion, i.e., an affective response of 
one's heart. However, this is not a reduction of ethics to 
psychology but rather a compounding of one's rational ethi-
cal response with one's affective response. 
G: MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORAL UNCONSCIOUSNESS 
There are those morally unconscious people who 
simply follow whatever feelings which may arise in them. 
The morally unconscious person is not only motivated by that 
which subjectively satisfying but rather is a person who 
lives in undisputed solidarity with his natural inclina-
tions. The morality of his actions has an accidental 
character by his insouciance to the moral sphere. He may 
be a decent man but he is not a morally conscious one. The 
morally unconscious person lacks the superactual will to be 
morally good. Such a person is not equipped with any 
definite moral position when faced with a moral dilemma. 54 
These people "yield to the tendency of their nature, " 55 and 
"make no use of their capacity to sanction and disavow. " 56 
They do not even consider the possibility of sanction and 
54 Ibid. , 2 6 5. 
55 Ibid. , 321. 
56 Ibid., 322. 
-,.. 
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disavowal. They only consider their freedom to exist in the 
limited role of appropriate outward expressions of their 
inner emotions. They do not consider saying "no" to the 
spontaneous generation of malicious glee but only consider 
how it should be appropriately expressed or controlled. 
The difference between the morally conscious and the 
morally unconscious person is that the morally conscious 
person makes a decisive use of his freedom with respect to 
sanction and disavowal whereas the morally unconscious has 
never even considered doing so. 
The morally conscious person not only utilizes his 
freedom of sanction and disavowal but also has a second mark 
of desiring to be good. One who is morally unconscious 
lacks this superactual will to be morally good. Conse-
quently, it is the having of this superactual willingness 
towards moral goodness which separates the morally conscious 
from the morally unconscious. 
The morally unconscious person merely follows the 
emotive responses which spontaneously develop in him. He 
follows whatever his nature gives rise to whether that be 
love, hate, sorrow, joy, etc., regardless of the appropri-
ateness of these responses. He does not even imagine that 
freedom might have an active role to play with respect to 
his responses. He recognizes the external dimensions of 
freedom but never acknowledges the deeper internal coopera-
tive freedom. He only recognizes his freedom when he is 
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required to use it in the case of actions. The morally 
unconscious person ignores the possibility of the use of his 
freedom to sanction and disavowal which is in complete 
contrast to the morally conscious person who makes full use 
of his sanctioning and disavowing faculties. 
While the morally conscious person takes a 
decisive stand towards his affective responses the morally 
unconscious person, by not making use of his capacity to 
sanction or to disavow his affective responses, implicitly 
identifies himself with them. Instead of ruling them, they 
rule him. As Von Hildebrand remarks, "The person who makes 
no use of his power to sanction and disavow lives in an 
undisputed solidarity with his own affective responses. " 57 
The non-sanctioned and the non-disavowed responses 
are not half-way between being sanctioned and being dis-
avowed but rather lie on the side of being sanctioned, even 
though conscious assent is not granted to them. Without the 
use of one's cooperative freedom affective responses have 
the character of being the position which one takes towards 
a situation. "The person implicitly identifies himself with 
them" 58 unless he disavows them. Von Hildebrand calls it a 
"tacit, undisputed solidarity" which is opposed to "the 
real, positive and explicit sanction. " 59 
57 Ibid., 325. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
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It is only within the general attitude of giving the 
proper value response that sanction and disavowal become 
possible. This holds especially true with respect to con-
forming to morally relevant values. As von Hildebrand 
explains: 
Sanction is only possible toward affective attitudes 
having the character of a value response, and disavowal 
only possible toward attitudes which are endowed with a 
disvalue and especially with a moral disvalue. 60 
H: THE PSEUDO-SANCTION 
Sanction must be distinguished from other types of 
solidarity with non-value responses, such as the malicious 
glee one expresses upon hearing of an enemy's misfortunes 
and exclaims, "I want to be glad for I despise her." This 
outspoken solidarity as opposed to a tacit solidarity 
portrays a use of one's freedom but, as von Hildebrand 
explains, 
it is in no way the deep ultimate stratum of a man's 
free spiritual center which is actualized in the sanc-
tion. It is in no way an overcoming of moral uncon-
sciousness, a breaking through to this deepest sovereign 
freedom which is in the sanction, but, on the contrary, 
it has the character of an obstinate spasm. 61 
The assent to a malicious "joy" 62 is in full 
opposition to the freedom found in sanctioning because it 
60 Ibid . , 3 2 6 . 
61 Ibid., 326-327. 
62Von Hildebrand uses the word "joy." The present author 
finds "glee" more appropriate since joy seems to be something 
which can only be given in response to a value or to a good. 
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carries with it a "voluntary self-imprisonment. 1163 It is 
not a freedom from the whims of one's nature but rather a 
complete surrender to them, 
a throwing ourselves into our affective responses and 
especially into our passions. It . is one of the typical 
cases of actualization of our "physical" freedom which 
entails simultaneously the complete absence of "moral" 
freedom. 64 
As in malicious glee, the passions gain "a pseudo-sanction, 
which is antithetical to every true sanction and, moreover, 
a caricature of it. 1165 
Sanction can only be given to a value response and 
especially to morally positive attitudes. In maintaining 
that the "supreme actualization of our ontological freedom 
(which is always simultaneously a moral freedom) can only 
take place when sustained by the logos of the world of 
values, " 66 von Hildebrand emphatically states: "The sanc-
tion is only possible as a 'concerting' with the world of 
values." 67 In contrast, the pseudo-sanction of giving 
explicit agreement to one's natural inclinations is only 
found with respect to morally neutral or morally negative 
values. 
Sanction also must be distinguished from the 
63 Ethics, 327. 
64 Ibid. 
character of the conscious and free position which charac-
teristically immoral persons take in their superactual 
rebellious attitude towards the world of values. This 
character is not merely the lack of moral consciousness 
found in the morally unconscious but is even a further 
removal away from moral consciousness, since "Real moral 
consciousness implies both the general will to be morally 
good and moral freedom which only the value response can 
possess. 1168 
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The deliberate full cooperation with one's morally 
negative affective responses (jealousy, envy, rage, etc.) is 
an antithesis to the true sanction. Unlike the morally 
unconscious person, the explicit enemy of God 69 does take a 
position with respect to his spontaneously arising affective 
responses. The position is one in which one identifies 
oneself with one's morally negative responses and disavows 
any positive response which may arise, such as pity or 
compassion. It is not a tacit solidarity with one's 
affective responses but rather a direct solidarity with 
those responses which are opposed to values. Von Hildebrand 
describes that this attitude "has the character of a 
diabolical caricature of the sanction, 1170 it is at best a 
.
68 Ibid., 328. 
69 The present author does not favor the philosophical 
use of this term but has retained it to be true to von 
Hildebrand's writings. 
70 Ethics, 329. 
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pseudo-sanction. 
While, as was noted earlier, "true sanction and dis-
avowal are inner gestures which are only possible as parti-
cipations in the objective intrinsic rhythm of values," 71 
the pseudo-sanction can only be towards morally negative 
values. It involves such a complete domination by pride, 
"not of obstinacy, but of a much deeper and most vicious 
pride," 72 the consequence of which is an extreme lack of 
moral freedom, the depth of which far surpasses the lack of 
moral freedom found in the morally unconscious person. 
Furthermore, this explicit solidarity with the negative 
affective responses that is given by the pseudo-sanction is 
in complete opposition to the solidarity of true sanction. 
I: JUSTICE TOWARDS VALUES 
Justice towards a value requires the right, due, and 
appropriate response which in the affective sphere is one 
which is sanctioned or disavowed and thereby is an integral 
component of the full response of a person's free spiritual 
center. Nothing else will be adequate. This is not a 
matter merely for the morally conscious person but for all 
people as a matter of justice to the realm of values and to 
themselves. Thus failure in not giving the appropriate 
response or in not sanctioning the appropriate response 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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and/or disavowing inappropriate responses is a failure 
in the order of justice and consequently a grave failure 
indeed. 
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Upon realizing that justice is due to the world of 
values, one must educate and expose one's self towards that 
realm so as to both know what response ought to be given and 
to align the sphere of one's affections with that response 
so as to give the appropriate response. c. s. Lewis notes 
that Plato recognized this when in his Laws he declares that 
young children "must be trained to feel pleasure, liking, 
disgust, and hatred at those things which really are 
pleasant, likable, disgusting, and hateful. " 73 Lewis also 
credits Aristotle as holding this view: "Aristotle says 
that the aim of education is to make the pupil like and 
dislike what he ought. 1174 
73 Lewis, 27, with the following citation: Plato, Laws, 
653. 
74 Lewis, 26, with the following citation: 
1104B . 
Eth. Nie. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Western philosophy has long held that there are 
realities which transcend the world known to man by his 
senses, namely values. Truth, Beauty, Goodness, etc., make 
it possible for value judgments to be true or false, objects 
to be ugly or beautiful, and aciions and attitudes to be to 
be morally good or evil, right or wrong. Metaphysics as the 
study of ultimate reality addresses these issues and also 
the question of the existence of a Supreme Being who is the 
source of these values. Those who follow this system are 
given practical principles by which to live their lives in 
the areas of work, recreation, and morality. 
In contrast, emotivism "bewilders those who ask for 
a doctrine and are given a word." 1 It is a "debunking 
term". It stupefies and bewilders, yet in some way satis-
fies the inquiring mind. "It satisfies by implying a sharp 
but untenable opposition between thought and feeling." 2 
The emotivists claim that their doctrines have no 
effects outside of philosophy. Like the skeptic they are 
seeking to eliminate the problems of philosophy. Yet, this 
1Black, 204. 
2 Ibid. 
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is done not by investigations that seek to solve the 
problems of philosophy but by dismissing such problems 
altogether. They claim that since emotivism excludes dis-
cussions of morality, aesthetics, religion, and politics it 
should have no effect on these areas. However, their "con-
clusions really do eviscerate the universe." 3 
It is not merely meaning which is attacked by emo-
tivism but the actual existence of certain realities. It is 
not merely that ethical statements are reduced to emotive 
exclamations but rather that all ethics and morality are 
themselves abolished. This applies not only to ethics but 
also to all values. Thus, aesthetics, religion, and meta-
physics, are also eliminated not merely from philosophical 
study but from existence altogether. 
In contrast, the phenomenological theory of 
affective morality as proposed by Dietrich von Hildebrand 
has been offered as a viable alternative. This theory 
affirms the traditional philosophical belief that there are 
realities beyond those which can be empirically measured and 
acknowledges that these realities deserve appropriate affec-
tive responses. Such responses can therefore be appropriate 
or inappropriate to a given object or to a given state of 
affairs. It is through the use of one's cooperative freedom 
that one can sanction the appropriate responses as well as 
disavow inappropriate responses. It is only by the exercise 
3Joad, 19. 
of one's power to sanction and disavow that one actualizes 
one's deepest moral freedom and "renders justice to the 
majesty of the value." 4 
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Both theories take emotions seriously, but in very 
different ways. Ayer's emotivism brings about the demise of 
ethics and results in undermining any rational foundation 
for emotional responses. If the statement "abortion is 
wrong," is literally meaningless and only emotive then it 
will cease to be emotive since there no longer is the 
"wrongness" which would evoke the emotion which is to be 
evinced. If an action is no longer evil, then there is no 
rational basis for one to experience sorrow or outrage over 
that action. 
In contrast, von Hildebrand's theory of moral 
affectivity confirms the validity of ethical judgments and 
expands the realm of ethics by including the affective 
sphere in its domain. This theory provides a greater digni-
ty to the emotional realm by revealing the rational and 
intentional nature of the affective response as well as its 
moral significance. 
By their very nature affective responses can have 
moral relevance. There are morally good affective 
responses, such as gratitude when one receives a good or 
righteous indignation over a great evil. There are also 
morally evil affective responses, such as enthusiasm for a 
4Ethics, 32 3. 
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mob-lynching or disrespect for that which is worthy of 
esteem. Because of this moral relevance, one is called to 
take a position towards affective responses which arise 
spontaneously in one's being. Morally good affective 
responses should be sanctioned while morally evil affective 
responses should be disavowed. 
This study has not only demonstrated a valid 
rational connection between ethics and emotions but also 
shown that emotions can be morally good or evil. It is 
hoped that the importance of this connection will lead to 
both a clearer understanding of ethics and emotions as well 
as the promotion of further study of this topic. 
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